Venture capital financing is widely believed to be influential for new innovative companies.
Abstract
Venture capital financing is widely believed to be influential for new innovative companies.
We provide empirical evidence that venture capital financing is related to product market strategies and outcomes of start-ups. Using a unique hand-collected database of Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups we find that innovator firms are more likely to obtain venture capital than imitator firms. Venture capital is also associated with a significant reduction in the time to bring a product to market, especially for innovators. Our results suggest significant interrelations between investor types and product market dimensions, and a role of venture capital for innovative companies.
Venture capital is widely believed to contribute to the competitive strength of the U.S.
economy by promoting the development of innovative start-ups. Yet little is known about what kind of companies are most likely to receive venture capital and what its impact is on these companies. It is commonly argued that a distinguishing feature of venture capital is the close involvement of investor's with the companies they finance. If one thinks of financial institutions on a spectrum from "arm's length" to "relational" investors, venture capital is typically viewed as lying at the latter extreme. It is generally believed that venture capitalists are extensively involved in the businesses they finance, not only closely monitoring their activities, but also providing valuable support and governance. The natural question to ask then is whether the involvement of a venture capitalist makes a difference in the development path of the entrepreneurial companies.
The issue of what kind of investor might help to promote innovative firms is also important in the context of the emerging literature on the interaction between financing and product market behavior. This literature has focused mainly on the relationship between debt levels and product market behavior. 1 However, the impact of equity investors, or more broadly, the importance of the investor type has received little attention. Hence, the role of involved equity investors, such as venture capitalists, on product market dimensions is an interesting but unexplored avenue for research.
A large informal literature discusses the benefits and costs of venture capital financing.
Venture capitalists are said to benefit their companies through a variety of activities such as mentoring, strategic advice, monitoring, certification to outside stakeholders, corporate governance, professionalization of the company and recruitment of senior management. 1 Brander and Lewis (1986) , for example, examine the relationship between capital structure and pricing of an oligopolist. Other important theoretical contributions to this literature include Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Poitevin (1989) , who examine endogenous financial constraints in predatory action games, Maksimovic and Titman (1991) , who examine how financial policy affects firms' incentive to maintain their product reputation; and Gertner, Gibbons and Scharfstein (1988) , who examine signaling across markets. Chevalier (1995a,b) , Philips (1995) , and Gordon and Phillips (1998) provide some empirical evidence. See Ravid (1988) for a survey.
On the other hand, obtaining venture capital financing also has its costs. The close involvement of the venture capitalist can be time consuming for the entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs can also experience a significant loss of control. Moreover, venture capital is said to be an expensive source of capital, which in turn reflects the benefits of having an involved investor.
In thinking about the product market dimension, we can draw on a large industrial organization literature. Among the competitive strategies of new companies, an important distinction is made in this literature between innovator and imitator strategies. Innovators are those firms that are the first to introduce new products or services for which no close substitute is yet offered in the market. Imitators are also engaged in relatively new products and technologies, but they are not the first movers in their markets, and therefore tend to compete on aspects other than innovation.
2 There is no general presupposition that one strategy is systematically better than the other. However, the choice of an innovator or imitator strategy has implications for the relative importance of strategic actions, such as the importance of being a first-mover or being quick to market.
With this distinction between innovator and imitator strategies, a number of questions arise relating to venture capital financing. First, does the choice of a product market strategy influence the type of financing obtained by a start-up company? There are a number of alternative hypotheses. For example, one alternative would be that the 2 In a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) broadly classify the advantages of being a first-mover in terms of leadership in product and process technology, preemption of assets, and the development of buyer switching costs; the disadvantages of being a first mover relate mainly to free-rider problems and to lock-in effects and sluggish responses of first-movers.
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) and Tirole (1998) for some of the game-theoretic foundations of the first-mover advantages.
3 Maggi (1996) shows that even with identical players there may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms pursue innovator and other firms pursue imitator strategies; expected profits, however, are equalized across companies. A similar conclusion emerges from the literature on the endogenous timing of innovation, summarized in Reinganum (1989) . One of the difficulties that typically plagues this line of research is the dearth of available datasets. In order to research these questions we use a unique hand-collected dataset of high technology companies in Silicon Valley, where the high incidence of entrepreneurial activity provides a rich setting for studying our hypotheses. We use a variety of instruments, including surveys, interviews, and commercial databases, as well as any publicly available information. The sample design enables us to observe a timeline of events for each company, including whether it obtains venture capital, and if so, when, and how long it takes to bring its product to market. In our data we can hence compare venture capital and non-venture capital backed companies. Through interviews, we are also able to obtain product market information that is usually not available, such as a founder's initial product market strategy. Companies are classified into two groups according to whether their initial strategy is best described as an innovator strategy or an imitator strategy. The criterion for being an innovator is that the company is either creating a new market, is introducing a radical innovation in an existing market, or is developing a technology that will lead to products that satisfy either of the above criteria.
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The first part of the analysis examines the relationship between the product market strategy and the investor type. In a probit model, controlling for age and industry effects, we find that innovators are more likely to be financed by venture capital than are imitators. 5 In a Cox proportional hazard duration model we also find that innovators obtain venture capital earlier in the life cycle than do imitators. These results refute the sometimes voiced criticisms that venture capital does not support the most innovative start-ups, or that venture capitalists invest in innovative companies only when they are already older and less risky.
In the second part of the analysis, we examine the relationship between venture capital financing and the time it takes a company to bring its product to market. In a duration model with time varying covariates that keeps track of when a company obtains venture capital, we find that the presence of venture capital is associated with faster time to market. This effect is particularly strong for innovators but statistically insignificant for imitators. One interpretation of these results is that venture capitalists influence companies to bring their product to market faster, and this effect is more pronounced for innovators, for whom this might be particularly valuable. This also explains our first finding, that innovators are more likely to obtain venture capital.
The third part of the analysis considers some alternative interpretations and additional 4 Imitators typically still have a certain amount of inventiveness, but they seek their competitive advantages not through innovation itself, but rather through differentiation, typically in terms of product features or marketing.
5 Insofar as ex-ante measures of innovation are likely to be correlated to ex-post measures, our results are consistent with Kortum and Lerner (1998) innovators, the product market dimension can be more important.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides some institutional background on venture capital. Section 2 lays out the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 examines the effect of the founding strategy on the type of financing.
Section 5 examines the relationship between venture capital financing and product market outcomes. Section 6 discusses alternative interpretations and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
Institutional background
It is frequently argued that venture capitalists are a distinct type of investor for entrepreneurial companies. In this section we give a brief description of venture capitalists, and the alternatives to venture capital.
Venture capitalists are full-time professional investors who invest for their partnership funds. Venture capitalists tend to follow the technology and market developments in their area of expertise closely, in order to stay in the deal flow and to be able to make an informed investment decision [Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995) ]. Before making an investment, they carefully scrutinize the founders and their business concepts [Fried and Hisrich (1994) , Garmaise (1999) ]. When making the investment, they bring financial expertise to structuring the deal and setting appropriate incentive and compensation systems [Sahlman (1988 [Sahlman ( , 1990 , Kaplan and Stromberg (1999) ]. After the initial investment, venture capitalists tend to be very active in the process of raising additional funds for their portfolio companies [Gorman and Sahlman (1989) ]. They also continuously monitor their companies both formally through participation at the board level and informally [Rosenstein (1988) , Lerner (1995) ]. As monitors and through their access to private information, like banks, they can help provide certification to outside stakeholders [James (1987) , Puri (1996 Puri ( , 1999 , The Economist (1997)]. They can provide valuable mentoring and strategic advice for the entrepreneurs and they frequently assist companies in providing business contacts and recruiting senior managers [Bygrave and Timmons (1992) ]. They tend to play an important role in corporate governance, frequently replacing the original founder as CEO [Hellmann (1998) ]. Finally, they often take an active role in guiding the exit decision, such as influencing a company's initial public offering [Lerner (1994) , Gompers (1995) ].
The main alternatives to venture capital financing are so-called "angels" (i.e., private individuals), corporations, banks, government, and self-financing. Sahlman (1990) emphasizes the high-powered incentives of venture capitalists and their high degree of specialization to the financing of young companies, often within only a very limited number of industry segments. Angel investors are independently wealthy individuals who diversify part of their wealth by investing in young companies. Typically, they do not have any staff for supervising their investments and tend to rely on their pre-existing networks to find new deals. Although there is considerable heterogeneity within the angel community, many exercise some other position as their main professional activity [Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1998) , Benjamin and Sandles (1998) ]. Corporations also invest in entrepreneurial companies, either as part of an organized venture capital fund, or on an adhoc basis. In addition to seeking financial gains, they frequently also pursue strategic objectives. Hellmann (1998) shows that entrepreneurs may be quite reluctant to receive funding from corporations if there are potential conflicts of interest. More generally, while a corporate investor may in principle be in a good position to add value to an entrepreneurial company, incentive problems and bureaucracy are frequently believed to limit the usefulness of a corporate investor [Gompers and Lerner (1998) , Block and McMillan (1993) ]. Commercial banks are an infrequent provider of funding to entrepreneurial companies. Apart from occasional loan commitments, banks sometimes engage in venture capital investments through wholly-owned subsidiaries. Regulatory constraints tend to make banks more conservative investors [Fiet and Fraser (1994) , Hellmann (1997) ]. Some investment banks also make venture capital investments, typically with an eye on future transactions, such as underwriting the IPO [Tkacs (1998) , Puri (1996 Puri ( , 1999 , and also examine the potential conflict of interest when investors are also underwriters]. Government financing is entirely passive by nature and consists mainly of grants [Lerner (1996) ]. Self-financing comprises financing from the founders, their families. and their friends [Fluck, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1998) ]. Hence it seems reasonable to conjecture that venture capitalist are a somewhat distinct type of investor who specialize in the financing of entrepreneurial companies.
The hypotheses
In this section we briefly outline the hypotheses that underlie our analysis. Very little is known about the interaction between the product market attributes and the type of investor, particularly in the financing of start-up companies. Therefore, an important question is whether any such interactions exist. In testing for interactions we will be careful to account for the timing structure of events. In particular, we distinguish between ex-ante strategy prior to financing, the financing itself, and the ex-post product market outcome. Thus, we examine the interrelationship of the ex-ante strategy (innovator or imitator) and the type of financing (venture capital or other) on the one hand, and the interrelationship of the type of financing and subsequent product market outcomes (in particular time to market) on the other.
Our first null hypothesis is that the type of financing is independent of product market strategy, i.e., there is no relationship between the ex-ante strategy and the type of financing of a start-up company. There are at least two alternative hypotheses. The first alternative is that venture capitalists prefer to invest in innovator companies, because they have a comparative advantage in identifying and then assisting innovator companies. In particular, their business experience may be particular helpful to sort through the greater ambiguity that surrounds an innovator company. A second alternative is that venture capitalists, being accountable to their own investors, may prefer to invest in imitator companies, for which the business concepts are easier to comprehend and communicate.
Under this view, venture capitalists may shy away from the uncertainty of an innovator company, but are eager to free ride on the learning of other companies by funding mainly imitator companies.
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Our second null hypothesis postulates that the type of financing is product market neutral,
i.e., there is no relation between the type of financing and product market outcomes of a start-up company. Arguably for start-ups one of the most important product market outcomes is the time it takes to bring a product to market. The null hypothesis would then argue that the type of financing (or investor type) does not affect time to market.
Again, there are at least two alternate hypotheses. The first alternative is that the knowledge and the involvement of venture capitalists allow them to better identify promising companies and then assist them in their quest to quickly bring a product to market. Here we would then find venture capital being associated with faster time to market. This effect might be particularly strong for innovators whose strategy is predicated on being a first mover. Alternatively, it could be the case that venture capitalists are patient investors with a higher tolerance for long development cycles, or even perfectionists that would slow down entrepreneurs. In this case, venture capitalists would be associated with longer time to market.
The data
In order to test our hypotheses we need a sample of firms chosen independently of financing (so that we have both venture and non-venture capital backed firms). Further, we need data on ex-ante strategies of firms, the kind and timing of financing (venture capital or not) received, and the timing of bringing a product to market. Our task is complicated by the fact that existing commercial databases such as Venture Economics and Venture One contain data only on venture capital backed firms, hence we cannot use these databases to identify a sample of firms to study. Further, these databases have scant data on the timeline of events, and ex-ante strategies of firms.
To conduct this study we therefore use a unique hand-collected dataset of start-ups in Silicon Valley culled from a combination of survey data as well as from publicly available data. This dataset is collated from combining two independent research efforts conducted over a period of several years, starting in 1994. The initial sample selection of Silicon
Valley firms and data collection was organized by Baron, Burton and Hannan (1996a,b) which we supplemented in 1996 and 1997 by an additional financing survey and related data collection. 7 To generate the initial list of companies three main datasources were used. The first two databases that listed firms in Silicon Valley were Rich's Everyday Sales Prospecting Guide, published by Rich's Guide, and Technology Resource Guide to Greater Silicon Valley, published by CorpTech. A stratified random sample was selected in which firms could have a legal age no older than 10 years and had to have more than 10 employees. Moreover, young and large firms were over-sampled and foreign firms were excluded. The Silicon Valley business press was used as a third datasource to identify very young firms that were not even listed in the two databases mentioned above. The purpose of doing this was to alleviate concerns that relying exclusively on guidebooks such as Rich's and CorpTech to construct the sample might underrepresent new start-ups since there is sometimes a considerable time lag before newly created firms appear in these guidebooks. Hence the sample was supplemented by adding on 22 very young firms identified through the Silicon Valley business press. Our sample consists of 173 start-up companies that are located in California's Silicon
Valley. In order to collect the data, a number of surveys were sent to key people in each firm, covering a wide range of questions about historic and current aspects of the companies. The overall response rate was 80%. Further, trained MBA and Ph.D.
students conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants of the sample companies. An effort was made to interview the founders, the current CEO, and a human resource manager for each company. This data was then augmented with any information provided by the company. Additionally, publicly available information about each of the firms in the study was gathered from on-line datasources such as Lexis/Nexis, Dialog, Business Connection, or ABI Inform. Further, for firms that had gone public, annual reports and 10-K or IPO prospectuses (where available) were also collected and used to 7 A more detailed description of the sampling procedures and their rationale can be found in Burton (1996) and in Baron, Burton and Hannan, (1996a,b) . These papers are based on a first round of interviews of some 100 companies that were performed in the summer of 1994. A second round of interviews was conducted in the summer of 1995 and follow-up interviews were conducted in the summer of 1996. This paper obviously uses the updated information. Where possible, we also augmented the publicly available information up to the end of our observation period, which we defined to be October 1997.
augment the data. To obtain financing data, between autumn 1996 to October 1997 we sent out a survey addressed to the most senior member of the company in charge of finance. The survey asked for a complete financing history of the company since the time of founding. The information was augmented with data available from two commercial databases, Venture Economics and Venture One, largely for the purpose of ascertaining which firms in our sample received venture capital. 8 We performed additional cross checks on the data by using the interview transcripts, researching public sources, and placing calls to the companies to resolve remaining ambiguities. We also continued to augment the data coming in from the companies, again using public information as well as the interview and survey material. Considerable emphasis was put on measuring the timing of events such as the date of founding, the date of the first product sale, and the timing of all financing rounds.
This experiment design has three distinct advantages. First, the sampling is independent of the form of financing. One-third of the sample is non-venture backed firms, allowing us to compare and contrast the behavior of venture backed firms with non-venture backed firms.
Second, we obtain a clear timeline of events. The design of the study allows us to observe companies over time, including retrospective data all the way back to the founding events.
Third, the use of surveys and interviews, though imperfect for the usual reasons, allows us to obtain data, such as the founding strategy, that is normally not available to researchers.
Additionally, Silicon Valley is an interesting environment to study since it has the highest start-up activity in the U.S. The narrow focus of our sample, specifically technology companies in Silicon Valley, has the advantage that we can control for common economic conditions, such as geography, labor markets, or regulation. The disadvantage is that the results may, obviously, have limited applicability for companies under different economic base conditions.
8 See Lerner (1994 Lerner ( , 1995 for a discussion of the Venture Economics database and for a discussion of the Venture One database. We found 107 of the sample companies in Venture
One and 95 in Venture Economics. Some 66 companies (38%) replied to our financing survey.
The variables
In what follows below we describe the main variables, and the way they are defined and collated. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics.
AGE is the age of the company in October 1997 measured from the birth date of the company. The date of legal incorporation is often taken as the birth date for companies and would appear to be a natural choice. However, for entrepreneurial firms this is far from obvious. In particular, in our sample, over half of the companies had some other significant event that preceded the date of incorporation, such as the beginning of normal business operations or the hiring of a first employee. Moreover, there does not appear to be any clear sequence of events that these companies follow in this initial period of creation. In this paper we therefore take a conservative approach and use the earliest date recorded in any of our datasources corresponding to the earliest evidence of firm activity as the date of birth.
SAMPLE-AGE is the age of the company at the time of sampling, measured from the date of birth of the company.
VC is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm has received venture capital; 0 otherwise. From the interviews, surveys, and commercial databases we identify which firms are financed by venture capitalists and the timing of such financing. Venture capitalists are professional investors who specialize in the financing of young private companies. We also create other venture capital related variables based on the timing of the venture capital. Thus VC(1) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm has received venture capital in the first year of its birth; 0 otherwise. VC(P) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company obtained venture capital before the date of first product sale. TIME-TO-VC measures the time from the birth of the company to the date of obtaining venture capital for the first time.
TIME-TO-MARKET measures the time from the birth of the company to the date of first product sale. This is an important strategic variable. We obtain this variable from informants' interviews at the company. These interviews included a targeted question of when the company brought its product to market. We augment this information with publicly available data on the company's product, using in particular the earliest product mention in Rich's guide or other public sources.
COMPUTER, TELECOM, and MEDICAL are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm is in the computer, telecommunications or medical-related industry respectively; 0 otherwise. OTHER is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is in another industry (mostly semiconductors); 0 otherwise.
INNOVATOR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the founding strategy of the firm was an innovator strategy; 0 otherwise. This is an important strategic variable as we are interested in measuring ex-ante strategies. There is no easy way of obtaining this data hence this variable deserves some discussion.
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The founders' interviews contained a specific section that asked about their perceived "distinctive competence and competitive advantage." Whenever possible, the same questions were asked to other people involved in the founding of the company, to cross check the information. The classification was then done based on content analyses of their answers. Further, this classification was supplemented by other objective measures. These include secondary sources (e.g., newspaper articles and industry analyst reports) and other material provided by the firm (such as a business plan). Two trained coders were then asked to separately read through all the interview transcripts as well as all the other collected material to assign a company to a strategy. 10 Both of the coders coded all of the sample companies independently . In cases in which they disagreed, a third person was asked to resolve the differences.
Conceptually, the coding of the innovator variable captures a notion of firms that introduce a new product that is considered not to be a close substitute to any product or service already offered in the market; firms that introduce a new product or service that is considered to perform an order of magnitude better than any substitute products already offered in the market; or firms that are developing new technologies that could lead to products satisfying either of the two criteria above. 11 Some typical quotes from the interviews that were associated with innovators are:
• " [A] new and unique introduction without a defined market."
• "It was a brand new discovery that could be patented."
• " [A] completely new idea, so there was no competition in the area."
• "There is intense competition in the drug delivery business; they are clearly in a technological race with many companies."
• "They appear to be at the forefront of developing technology for the information superhighway… Initial core competence was technology developed at Stanford."
12 Representative quotes include:
• "The initial competence of the company was a customer focus."
• "Understanding technology, customers' needs and how to apply the former to the latter."
• "Competitive advantage is providing both hardware and software expertise… [their] product is the most feature-rich in the industry."
• " [T] competitive advantage. We were able to obtain founding strategies for 149 companies and hence this is our effective sample size.
Robustness checks on the data
We next discuss some potential limitations of the data and a number of robustness checks we performed to deal with these concerns.
A common issue with the use of survey data is the use of retrospective data and the bias such data can impose. Although the innovator variable measures the initial strategic intent, it still relies on retrospective information and could be subject to retrospective biases. Some argue [Bhide, (1998) ] that entrepreneurs may have a tendency to distort or dramatize their company's history. To avoid such problems, a number of measures were taken, both during the data gathering stage and afterwards.
First, the interview subjects were not asked to classify themselves as innovators or imitators. Instead, this information was extrapolated from a variety of information sources that included not only the founders' technical descriptions, but also the descriptions of other parties involved in the founding of the company and other available information about the company. Second, if there is retrospective bias it is likely to be stronger for older companies, so that older firms are more likely to portray themselves as innovators.
Hence we examine the age composition of the innovator variable. We divide the sample into its younger and older halves and perform a test to determine whether older firms are more likely to be classified as innovators. Table 2 , panel A, performs a χ 2 test and reveals no significant differences, suggesting that retrospective biases are unlikely to be driving this result. Third, we examine whether companies formalized the strategies that they intended to pursue at the time of receiving venture capital, in terms of a written detailed business plan. Venture capitalists typically use the business plan to carefully scrutinize a company's plans before investing in it. This is particularly important for an innovator company, because it is likely to be inherently more difficult to evaluate. The writing of a business plan also forces entrepreneurs to define their strategy more explicitly. The fact that these companies formalize their intention in writing would also limit the extent to which their recollections become distorted.
Last, but not least, while a measurement of the ex-ante intent is most relevant to our hypothesis, the question arises whether this intent is reflected in the realized behavior of these companies. It is reasonable to expect that ex-ante strategies are correlated with expost outcomes. We examine this by analyzing the firm's patenting behavior, because patenting data reveals information about the ex-post behavior of the companies. [See Griliches (1990) and Kortum and Lerner (1998) for a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using patenting data as a measure of innovation.] We gathered additional data to examine patenting behavior of the firms in our sample. We identify patent activity by using the Lexis/Nexis on-line database. For each individual firm, we identify all patents for which that particular firm is defined as the Assignee-at-Issue over the entire sample period, that is, from birth of the company until October 1997. We classify companies by whether or not they receive patents. We create a dummy variable PATENT that is 1 if the company received a patent; 0 otherwise. Table 2 , panel C, shows the relationship between an innovator strategy and the propensity to patent. The χ 2 test finds that innovators are indeed more likely to obtain patents, showing that more often than not, ex-ante intent is translated into a realized measure of innovation. Furthermore, we examine the natural logarithm of the number of patents, which is a widely used measure of innovation [Kortum and Lerner (1988) ]. Another concern with the data is the potential survivorship bias, because companies are not sampled at birth. A number of arguments, however, suggest that this survivorship bias is relatively minor. First, a particular effort was made to include many young companies, precisely to reduce any survivor bias. As a consequence, our sample captures firms at a much earlier stage than do most other databases. 13 Second, unlike many other studies in finance relating to venture capital, we are able to sample companies independent of their financial choices. In fact, our sampling criterion is essentially based on the existence of the company, and not on any endogenous financial measure. In particular, our sampling criteria are not affected in any way by the firm getting venture capital. Finally, a number of companies fail within our sample and we estimate a probit to see whether the probability of failing is systematically related to any known characteristic. We find that the strategy (innovator or imitator), the presence of venture capital, the age of the firm, or any industry effects are not statistically significant in predicting exit from the sample. The within-sample behavior thus suggests that selection issues are unlikely to have a major effect on our results.
Finally, although we had a high overall response rate, we were still unable to code every company in the sample. We identified a strategy for 149 companies in the sample. This raises the question whether there are response biases. We test for response biases by estimating a probit in which the dependent variable is whether we obtain ex-ante strategy for the firm. We find that the presence of venture capital, the age of the firm, any industry 13 An interesting issue that emerged in this research is that even at a conceptual level, it is not clear how one could eliminate all survivorship bias. As we discussed, there is no objective date at which a company is born. Given this inherent ambiguity about if and when entrepreneurial activities should be considered a new company, it seems conceptually impossible to eliminate all survivor bias.
effects are not statistically significant in predicting responses received. This suggests that there is little systematic response bias.
Does strategy affect the type of financing?
In this section we examine the first null hypothesis that concerns the relationship between initial product market strategy and the type of financing. control for factors such as the age of the firm and the industry the firm is in. Table 3 reports the probit regression results. We find that innovators are more likely to receive venture capital financing, and this result is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The probit model estimates the overall likelihood of a company receiving venture capital financing, but it does not use information on the timing of the venture capital investment.
We are interested in the length of time it takes to obtain venture capital and the influence of the strategy on that duration. A standard procedure for dealing with duration data is to employ a hazard model [Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) , Kiefer (1988) ]. To proceed we must specify the exact nature of our hazard model. We can choose from a number of parametric models (such as Weibull) or we can use a semi-parametric model. The parametric models are attractive because of their simplicity, but by imposing as much structure as they do, the models can distort the estimated hazard rate. Because fewer restrictions can result in a more accurate representation, we use the proportional hazard model -a common choice among researchers for modelling duration. The formal model is
h(t) = h 0 (t) exp{ β'X}
The Cox proportional hazard model does not impose any structure on the baseline hazard h 0 (t). Cox's partial likelihood estimator provides a way of estimating β without requiring estimates of h 0 (t). Suppose the complete durations are ordered t 1 < t 2 <…< t n . The risk set with respect to any moment of time is the set of firms that have not yet exited just prior to that time. The conditional probability that observation i exits at time t i given that any of the observations in the risk set R i could have been concluded at duration t i is
This conditional probability is independent of the baseline hazard function.
14 A distinguishing feature of our duration data is that some of the observations are right censored; that is, at the end of the sample period the firm has not obtained venture capital, yet there is a positive probability of such an event occurring. Our hazard model explicitly takes such censoring into account.
We report both the coefficients and the hazard ratios (i.e., the relative risks). A positive coefficient on x implies a higher x is linked to a higher hazard rate and thus a lower expected duration. For ease of interpretation, we also give the hazard ratios. The hazard ratio tells us how much the hazard (i.e., the instantaneous risk) of the event increases for a unit change in the independent variables. In the case of a dummy variable, this is equal to the ratio of the (instantaneous) probabilities of the two possible states. Table 4 shows the result from the Cox regression. The dependent variable is TIME-TO-VC, i.e., the time to obtaining venture capital.
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We control for industry effects. The 14 The partial log likelihood is:
Technically, this is for the simplest case where exactly one firm exits at each distinct time and there are no censored observations. The partial log likelihood can handle censoring easily. An observation whose spell is censored between duration t j and t j+1 appears in the summation in the denominator of the likelihood function of observation i through j but not in any others, and does not enter in the numerator. 15 There may be some intervening events that imply that a company will no longer obtain any venture regression shows that the INNOVATOR variable is significant. Innovators are faster to obtain venture capital, with an estimated hazard ratio of 1.69. This says that, relative to imitators, innovators are 1.69 times more likely to obtain venture capital in any given period of time. This result is statistically significant at 1%.
These two results reject the first null hypothesis that there is no relationship between an entrepreneurial company's strategy and its propensity to obtain venture capital financing.
Firms pursuing an innovator strategy are more likely to obtain venture capital and to obtain it more quickly. This suggests that venture capitalists are not shying away from the uncertainty of innovative business concepts, but rather seem to embrace them. Nor does it seem to be true that if they invest in innovator companies they invest at a later stage when much of the uncertainty may already have been resolved. Instead, we find that innovators are faster to obtain venture capital. The natural question to ask is, what it is that attracts innovators and venture capitalist to each other? Is there any particular role that venture capitalists can play in the development of innovator companies? To examine this we will now turn to the relationship between venture capital and product market outcomes.
Type of financing and product market outcomes
In this section we examine the second null hypothesis, that the presence of a venture capitalist does affect product market outcomes. We consider the effect of venture capital on the time it takes a company to bring its product to market. We estimate a Cox duration regression. The dependent variable is TIME-TO-MARKET, which measures the time from founding up to the date of the first product sale.
When we examine duration data with respect to the length of time it takes to get a product to market, we have an additional complication. We are interested in the influence of capital, namely if it goes public, out of business or gets acquired. We model this as a standard competing risk, so that either of these events constitutes a terminal non-censored event.
venture capital on the time to product market, and venture capital is obtained by firms at different points of time. We therefore modify the original Cox proportional hazard model to allow for time varying covariates. The model being estimated now takes the form of
h(t,X(t)) = h(t,0) exp[β'X(t)]
where h (t,X(t) ) is the hazard rate at time t for a firm with co-variates X(t). The Cox regression estimates the coefficient vector β. Again, our model also takes into account the right censoring of our data.
Hence, apart from the usual industry controls, the main independent variable is a dummy variable VC(t), that indicates whether the firm has received any venture capital financing by time t. Companies do not necessarily start with venture capital, but obtain venture capital after variable lengths of time. A company may thus change its status from not being venture capital backed to being venture capital backed. Note that depending on strategy and industry, a company may have a shorter or longer time to market, which is a function of the underlying technological parameters. Indeed, from table 1 we see that on average innovators take more time to bring a product to market than imitators. The question we are interested in here, is, for a company with a given technology, whether venture capital reduces the time to market. Table 5 reports the coefficients and the hazard ratios of the estimated models. Looking first at the entire sample, we see that the likelihood of the first product sale increases by a factor of 1.88 with the advent of a venture capitalist. This is statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 5 also shows the results of the Cox regression for the subsample of innovators and imitators. The presence of a venture capitalist increases the likelihood of a first product sale by a factor of 3.37 in the innovator sample (this is again statistically significant at the 1% level), while it has no statistically significant effect in the imitator sample.
As a robustness check we reran all of our duration models as Weibull regressions, which is a standard fully parametric model (and which takes time-dependency into account in the same way as does the Cox model). All of our results are very similar, and the significance levels were frequently even stronger.
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These results reject the second null hypothesis that venture capital is product market neutral. We find that venture capital is associated with faster time to market. This association is particularly strong for innovator companies. These results tie in with the findings in the previous section. We found that innovators are more likely to take venture capital. We then asked the question what it was, that attracts innovators to venture capital.
An interpretation consistent with the results of this section is that the presence of a venture capitalist helps companies in their quest to be faster to market, especially for innovators, whose strategy is predicated on first-mover advantages. This interpretation helps explain why innovators are more likely to take venture capital in the first place.
Extensions
One of the main advantages of the use of this dataset is the existence of a clear timeline of events that allows us to establish whether preceding events are correlated with subsequent events. This is advantageous over standard cross-sectional analysis, in which two variables are observed at the same point in time, and disentangling the impact of one on the other can be difficult. Our results indicate that an engagement of venture capital leads to a subsequent increase in the likelihood that a company brings its product to market. Therefore, a natural interpretation is that the presence of venture capital helps these companies to bring their product to market. Nonetheless, other explanations are possible.
In this section we discuss the robustness of our results and some alternative interpretations. 16 As another robustness check, we reran all of our regressions dropping those companies that received no external financing at all. We also classified companies in the computer industry into hardware and software firms, gave them a separate industry dummy and reran our regressions. Again, for all of these our qualitative results are unaffected.
We first consider whether firms themselves believe that venture capital is important to them. Companies were asked in surveys to list the events that they considered milestones in the development of their firm. We consider all the firms that replied to this part of the survey and that received some kind of external financing. For the venture capital backed companies we find that 59% list obtaining venture capital as a milestone. For the other companies we find that 27% list obtaining financing (from some source other than venture capital) as a milestone. This difference is significant at the 5% level. This is an interesting and significant result. It shows that entrepreneurs consider obtaining venture capital a more significant event than obtaining finance from other sources.
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Although our results are consistent with venture capitalists influencing firms to bring their product to market earlier, an alternative interpretation of our results could be that venture capitalists select companies with faster time to market. Given that we have already taken into account the timeline of events (i.e., we have already established Granger-causality), it would have to be the anticipation of a faster time to market that would lead to such an equilibrium. The informal literature typically suggests that venture capitalists are involved both in selecting good companies and in adding value to them, and theory suggests that these may well be complementary activities. 18 As such, it is unlikely that one would be operating to the exclusion of the other. Nonetheless, we conduct some preliminary tests to rule out some potential explanations. Note that since we examine equilibrium outcomes, the same basic estimation procedure applies irrespective of whether venture capitalists select firms with certain characteristics, or firms with certain characteristics select venture capital. However, for expositional ease, in the rest of the paper, when we talk of selection, we describe it as selection by venture capitalists, though the estimation 17 Further, in the venture capital backed companies we find that 66% (21 out of 32) of the innovators and 50% (11 out of 22) of the imitators considered obtaining venture capital to be a milestone. Although the sample is too small to obtain statistical significance, the numbers nonetheless suggest that innovators are also more likely to consider obtaining venture capital to be a significant milestone. 18 In particular, the marginal return to assisting a company should increase in the expected quality of the company, which is an increasing function of the amount of screening.
procedure is the same if firms select venture capitalists.
First, venture capitalists may be selecting firms based on particular observable characteristics, suggesting that a two-stage regression approach might be appropriate [see Puri (1996) for an application]. For that, our probit analysis provides the first step. Table   3 shows that only firm strategy and industry affect selection. The cleanest way to control for these in the second step is simply to rerun the duration model within the respective subsamples of innovators and imitators, as in Table 5 . We also rerun our results within the computer industry (which accounts for about 50% of our sample). We obtain qualitatively similar results with venture capital being associated with faster time to market for innovators. These findings effectively rule out selection of venture capital based on observable information as an explanation for the reduced time to market.
Second, we test for selection of firms based on the notion that venture capitalists have expert knowledge of industry conditions, which helps them to pick the right industries at the right time. We augment the duration model by adding as an independent variable the P/E ratio of the industry at the birth of the company, where the P/E ratio is taken to be a price based measure of the market expectations for the industry. Third, we examine whether our result of faster time to market for innovators is driven by venture capitalists investing in firms that are known to be bringing a product to market 19 The P/E ratio for the industries is obtained from the 1998 Standard and Poor's Analysts' Handbook and is the average of the annual high and low P/E ratios for the corresponding industry categories within the S&P 500.
soon. Prior to selling its product, a company often makes an announcement about its expected product release. We rerun our time to market regression examining those cases in which venture capitalists invest before product announcements, as well as those cases in which venture capitalists invest shortly before the announcement (six months or one year prior). Table 6 shows that we find that the impact of venture capital on time to market continues to be significant for innovator companies, suggesting that selection based on product announcements that are either publicly known or anticipated within the year is not driving our results. We collect information on the amount of funds that companies raise up to the point of their product launch. Table 7 reports the results from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the amount of funds raised up to the time of the first product sale and the main independent variable is a dummy variable, VC(P), that indicates whether the company received any venture capital by the time of the product launch. We find that the presence of venture capital increases the amount of funds raised by imitators, but not by innovators.
This provides one possible explanation for why some imitators select venture capital. It also suggests that for innovator companies, the distinguishing feature of venture capital is 20 One may also be concerned that the faster time to market is related to some kind of incentives for venture capitalists to "grandstand" their innovator companies. Gompers (1996) provides evidence that younger venture capitalists are more likely to bring companies to the IPO market early, in order to showcase their successes. Companies pay for this grandstanding as they experience larger underpricing.
In addressing whether our result can be explained by similar concerns that venture capitalists want to showcase successful innovators, we examined the underpricing of the venture capital backed IPOs in our sample. In unreported regressions, we find no differences in the underpricing of innovator and imitator companies. This suggests that our product market results are unlikely to be driven by concerns about grandstanding.
not the provision of funds. All together, this evidence suggests that venture capital provides different things to different companies: for imitators, venture capital matters in terms of providing financial resources, and for innovators, it matters on other dimensions, such as for product market aspects.
Conclusion
In this paper we use a unique dataset of Silicon Valley start-up companies to explore the role of venture capital financing. We believe we are the first to empirically examine and document the interrelationship between the type of investor (venture capitalists vs. other investors) and aspects of the product market behavior of start-up firms. We find that firms pursuing an innovator rather than an imitator strategy are more likely to obtain venture capital financing. We also find that obtaining venture capital is associated with faster time to market, especially for innovators.
Our results have implications for several branches of the literature. From a finance perspective, our results suggest that the appropriateness of choosing an involved investor depends on the strategic objectives of the company. From an industrial organization perspective, our results suggest that a firm's choice of financing seems to affect its ability to secure first-mover advantages. Our results also make a direct contribution to the emerging literature on venture capital, suggesting that venture capital financing can have an impact on the development path of a start-up company, and in particular on its product market position.
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